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Abstract 
 
Background. We examined whether the verbal cue, proportion of complications, was a more 
diagnostic cue to deceit than the amount of information provided (e.g. total number of 
details).  
Method. In the experiment, 53 participants were interviewed. Truth tellers (n = 27) discussed 
a trip they had made during the last twelve months; liars (n = 26) fabricated a story about 
such a trip. The interview consisted of an initial recall followed by a model statement (a 
detailed account of an experience unrelated to the topic of investigation) followed by a post 
model statement recall. The key dependent variables were the amount of information 
provided and the proportion of all statements that were complications.  
Results. The proportion of complications was significantly higher amongst truth tellers than 
amongst liars, but only in the post model statement recall. The amount of information 
provided did not discriminate truth tellers from liars in either the initial or post model 
statement recall.  
Conclusion.  The proportion of complications is a more diagnostic cue to deceit than the 
amount of information provided as it takes the differential verbal strategies of truth tellers and 
liars into account.  
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Within-subjects verbal lie detection measures: 
A comparison between total detail and proportion of complications  
In each investigative interview two aims are central: To obtain as much information 
as possible and to determine whether the provided information is true or false (Loftus, 2011). 
Regarding the second aim, verbal deception research has shown that the total amount of 
information provided is amongst the most diagnostic cues to deception, with truth tellers 
typically reporting more details than liars (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vrij, 2008). In this article, we tested the hypothesis that another verbal deception cue, 
the proportion of complications, would be more successful in distinguishing truth tellers from 
liars than the total amount of information, because this variable takes the differential verbal 
strategies of truth tellers and liars more into account and is more suitable for within-subject 
assessments. 
Total amount of information 
In their meta-analysis of Criteria-Based Content Analysis, a list of 19 different verbal 
criteria which includes the criterion ‘total details’ (e.g. units of information), the criterion 
‘total details’ emerged as the most diagnostic cue to deceit, d = .77 (Amado et al., 2015). 
Truth tellers typically provide more details than liars because liars lack the imagination to 
fabricate details that sound plausible, a conclusion derived from the CBCA literature 
(Köhnken, 2004; Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015), or because they are 
unwilling to provide many details out of fear that those details give leads to investigators that 
they are lying (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014). 
 The total details variable is difficult to use in real life. The difficulty investigators 
face is that it is impossible to determine how much detail someone should provide to be 
judged as truthful (Nahari & Vrij, 2014, 2015; Vrij, 2016) This of course depends on the 
context, events rich in detail can be described in much more detail than events poor in detail 
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(Vrij, 2008); and it also depends on individual differences, some people are more eloquent 
than others (Merckelbach, 2004; Nahari, & Pazuelo, 2015). One way around this issue is to 
introduce a within-subjects comparison, that is, to compare one part of a statement with 
another part of a statement. At least two different within-subjects comparisons can be made. 
First, someone can examine the proportion of a specific type of detail within a statement, 
such as the proportion of details that can be verified (verifiable details divided by all details), 
as used in the Verifiability Approach (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014). In this comparison, it 
does not matter anymore how detailed a statement is, thereby taking away the possible effects 
of the type of event and individual differences, all that matters is the percentage of details that 
can be verified. A second comparison is to introduce two phases in an interview and to 
compare the statements of both phases. In this case, again, it does not matter anymore how 
detailed a statement is, all that matters is the difference in detail between the two phases. In 
this experiment, we combined these two within-subjects comparisons. 
 Proportion of complications 
 Total amount of information is a generic measure which does not take into account all 
types of detail someone can report. In the present experiment, following Vrij et al. (2017b), 
we broke down this generic measure into components that we believe are more sensitive to 
the different verbal strategies that truth tellers and liars use. In brief, we expected truth tellers 
to provide stories that include non-essential details that make the story more complex 
(complications). By comparison, we expected liars to provide details that are based on 
common knowledge, or to justify why they cannot provide certain types of information (self-
handicapping strategies). As a result, the proportion of complications (complications / 
(complications + common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies)) should be 
higher in truth tellers than in liars.1  
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 According to the CBCA literature a complication is a reported activity or event that was 
not expected or planned (“The air conditioning was not working properly in the hotel”) 
(Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Vrij et al., 2017b). We prefer a slightly more inclusive definition: 
“an occurrence that makes a situation more difficult than necessary”. Information which is 
considered to be a complication according to the CBCA definition is also a complication 
according to this definition, but this definition includes more information as complications. 
For example, if someone says that when driving from their hometown A to their holiday 
destination B, they also paid a short visit to town C, this short visit to C is considered a 
complication according to our definition but not according to the CBCA definition. 
Complications are one of the 19 criteria that appears on the CBCA list of criteria, and are 
more likely to occur in truthful statements than in deceptive statements (Amado et al., 2015; 
Vrij, 2008; Vrij et al., 2017b). Making up complications requires imagination, but liars may 
not have adequate imagination to do so (Köhnken, 2004; Vrij, 2008). In addition, research 
examining liars’ interview strategies showed that liars prefer to keep their stories simple 
(Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007), but adding complications makes the story more 
complex.  
 Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical information about 
events (“We visited the Louvre museum where was saw the Mona Lisa”) (Vrij et al., 2017b). 
Liars are more likely to include common knowledge details in their statements than truth 
tellers (Sporer, 2016; Volbert & Steller, 2014; Vrij et al., 2017b). Truth tellers have personal 
experiences of an event and are likely to report such unique experiences (DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). When they do so the statement is no longer scripted. If 
liars do not have personal experiences of the event they report, they then will draw upon 
general knowledge to construe the event (Sporer, 2016).  In case liars do have personal 
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experiences of the event, they may not report them due to their desire to keep their stories 
simple.  
 Self-handicapping strategies refer to explicit or implicit justifications as to why 
someone is not able to provide information (“I can’t remember; it was a while ago when this 
happened”, “Nothing unexpected happened; I am a very organised person”; “I fell asleep in 
the bus”) (Vrij et al., 2017b). Liars are more likely to include self-handicapping strategies in 
their statements than truth tellers (Vrij et al., 2017b). For liars, who are inclined to keep 
stories simple, not having to provide information is an attractive strategy. However, liars are 
also concerned about their credibility and believe that admitting lack of knowledge and/or 
memory appears suspicious (Ruby & Brigham, 1998). A potential solution is to provide a 
justification for the inability to provide information. Note that the justification is crucial for a 
self-handicapping strategy: the statement ‘I can’t remember’ itself is not a self-handicapping 
strategy, it is called admitting lack of memory and part of the Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis tool (Amado et al., 2015). Also, note that the justification does not have to be made 
explicit. The example “I fell asleep in the bus” is an implicit justification for not being able to 
provide information.   
 Examining complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping 
strategies has two advantages compared to examining total details.  First, the three separate 
measures should be more effective in discriminating truth tellers from liars than the generic 
measure of total details. Both truth tellers and liars must provide some details in interviews, 
with truth tellers perhaps providing somewhat more total details than liars. However, the 
overall set of details includes many types of detail including complications, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies. Truth tellers are more likely to report 
complications, whereas liars are more likely to report common knowledge details and self-
handicapping strategies. Based on this the proportion of complications (complications / 
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(complications + common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies)) -which 
represents the proportion of cues to truthfulness- can be calculated. This proportion of 
complications score exploits the different verbal strategies that truth tellers and liars use – it 
should be higher in truth tellers- and should therefore be a more diagnostic cue to deceit than 
the generic measure total details. Second, the proportion of complications is a within-subjects 
measure, which are preferred by practitioners (Vrij, 2016) and scholars (Nahari & Pazuelo, 
2015; Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari, in press), because it controls, at least to some extent, for 
differences in context and personal characteristics. 
 Two phases interview  
 In the present experiment, the interview consisted of two phases. In phase 1, the initial 
recall phase, interviewees (truth tellers and liars) were invited to report their alleged 
experiences (an alleged trip) in as much detail as possible. This was followed by a second 
phase, the post model statement recall phase, in which they were again invited to report in as 
much detail as possible all they could remember. In between these two phases, they listened 
to a model statement, a detailed account of an experience unrelated to the topic of 
investigation (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher, 2015). 
 A model statement raises the expectations amongst interviewees how much information 
is required (Ewens et al., 2016) and therefore typically results in more detailed answers 
(Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij, 2014; Ewens et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2017b). Because both truth 
tellers and liars will realise that they are expected to provide more detailed answers after 
having listened to a model statement, they are both likely to report more details after listening 
to a model statement (Bogaard et al., 2014; Ewens et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 2017b). However, 
the type of detail they report may differ (Vrij et al., 2017b). Truth tellers are more likely to 
add complications to their stories than liars. Complications are often parts of an account that 
truth tellers may have thought were not essential and therefore worthwhile to report. The 
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raised expectations to provide more details may encourage truth tellers to include more 
complications than liars. Common knowledge details may also become a more diagnostic cue 
to deceit after listening to a model statement. The urge to provide more details may 
encourage truth tellers to decide to describe separate events in more detail, which reduces the 
likelihood that they sound scripted. The same urge to provide more details may encourage 
liars to describe more events, and these will probably discussed in a more scripted manner. 
Also, self-handicapping strategies may become more diagnostic after being exposed to a 
model statement. Rather than providing more details, a model statement may encourage liars 
to say why they cannot provide more details, which would mean introducing a self-
handicapping strategy.  
 Vrij et al. (2017b) found support for this reasoning regarding complications, with truth 
tellers –but not liars- reporting more complications after listening to a model statement. As a 
result, the proportion of complications was higher for truth tellers than for liars, particularly 
in the condition where a model statement was present. However, in Vrij et al. (2017b), 
interviewees only gave one statement compared to two statements in the current experiment. 
In other words, in the present experiment we examined the impact of a model statement in a 
within-subjects design, which Vrij et al. (2017b) did not do. 
Hypotheses 
 Truth tellers will report more total details, more complications, fewer common 
knowledge details and fewer self-handicapping strategies than liars (Hypothesis 1). From 
Hypothesis 1 follows that the proportion of complications (e.g., proportion of cues to 
truthfulness) will be higher in truth tellers than in liars (Hypothesis 2). Truth tellers will 
report more total details, more complications and fewer common knowledge details in Phase 
2, post model statement recall phase, than in Phase 1, initial recall phase (Hypothesis 3). 
Liars will report more total details, more common knowledge details and more self-
9 
Within-subjects verbal lie detection measures 
handicapping strategies in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 (Hypothesis 4). From Hypotheses 2 and 3 
it follows that the difference between truth tellers and liars in the proportion of complications 
will be more pronounced in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 of the interview (Hypothesis 5).  
Method 
Participants 
A total of 53 participants (14 males and 39 females) took part in the study. Their 
average age was M = 21.70 years (SD = 5.14).  
Procedure 
 The Procedure was derived from Vrij et al. (2017a, b). Participants were recruited via 
an advert on the university intranets and advertisement leaflets. The advert explained that the 
experiment would require participants to tell the truth or lie about a trip away that they may 
(or may not) have taken within the last year. We decided upon last year so that truth tellers 
would still remember many details about their trip and liars could not easily say “I can’t 
remember” when answering the questions.  On arrival to the laboratory, participants received 
a participant information sheet and signed an informed consent form. Both truth tellers and 
liars then completed a selection form on which they wrote down which cities they had visited 
during the last twelve months for at least two nights. They also wrote down whether they had 
ever visited these cities before and had ever lived there. For truth tellers (n = 27), the 
experimenter selected a city where the participant had stayed during the last twelve months 
for at least two nights without having been there before and without having lived there. For 
liars (n = 26), the experimenter selected a city chosen for a truth teller after checking that the 
liar had never been before to that city and had never lived there.  
Truth tellers and liars were then left with a computer with internet access and were 
told they had twenty minutes to prepare for their interview, or to let the experimenter know if 
they were ready before that time. In order to avoid participants feeling that they had to 
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prepare in a rush we ensured that they were given plenty of time to prepare. All participants 
were told that they were allowed to make notes while doing their research. Truth tellers and 
liars were told that it was important to be convincing because, by means of a sanction, if they 
did not appear convincing they would be asked to write a statement about what they told the 
interviewer in the interview. In total 19 cities were discussed amongst the participants during 
their interviews. In a pre-interview questionnaire, the truth tellers and liars rated their 
thoroughness of preparation via three items: (1) shallow to (7) thorough; (1) insufficient to 
(7) sufficient; and (1) poor to (7) good. The answers to the three questions were averaged 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .80) and the variable is called ‘preparation thoroughness’. They were 
also asked whether they thought they were given enough time to prepare themselves with the 
following question: ‘Do you think the amount of time you were given to prepare was: (1) 
insufficient to (7) sufficient. 
 The interview. 
Prior to the interview the experimenter told the interviewer about which city to 
interview the participant. The interviewer was unaware of the veracity status of the 
participant. To make the interviewee feel comfortable and to avoid floor effects in 
establishing rapport interviewees were offered a glass of water from the interviewer, as 
offering something helps rapport building (reciprocation principle, Cialdini, 2007).  
The female interviewer started by saying: “I understand from my colleague that you 
have visited _________”. This was followed by the question: “Could you please tell me in as 
much detail as possible everything you did when you were at _________ from the moment 
you arrived to the moment you left?”  
After the answer the interviewer said that the she wanted the participant to report the 
trip again but that she now wanted to give the participant an idea how much detail she wanted 
to hear by playing a model statement. An audiotaped model statement was then played. It was 
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1.30 minutes long detailed account of someone attending a Formula 2 motor racing event 
(Leal et al., 2015). The account was a spontaneous, unscripted, recall of an event truly 
experienced by the person. After the model statement the interviewee was again asked to tell 
in as much detail as possible everything s/he did when you were at _________ from the 
moment s/he arrived to the moment s/he left?  
The interviews were audio recorded and subsequently transcribed.  
Post-interview questionnaire. 
After the interview, participants completed a post-interview questionnaire in which 
they indicated how motivated they were to perform well during the interview (measured on a 
5-point Likert scale from 1 = not at all motivated to 5 = very motivated). 
Coding 
All coders were blind to the hypotheses and Veracity condition. 
 Detail.  
 The coders were taught the coding scheme by the first author who has more than 
twenty years of experience in coding details. A coder first read the transcripts and coded each 
detail in the interview, whereby a detail was defined as a unit of information. To give an 
example, the following answer contains ten details: “I have an aunt there, ah – living in a 
house close to the lake. We went in my truck, ah, five of us, also my sister's boyfriend and my 
boyfriend”. Each detail in the actual trip section and each detail in the planning of the trip 
section were coded only once; thus repetitions were not coded. A second coder coded a 
random sample of 20 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability between the two coders, using the two-
way random effects model measuring consistency, was satisfactory (Single Measures ICC = 
.86). 
The coders were also taught how to code complications, common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies by the first author. One coder coded all complications, 
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common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies that appeared in the transcripts. 
Complications are occurrences that makes a situation more difficult than necessary. Three 
examples of complications are: i) …”she was meant to get a sirloin and I was meant to get a 
rump but she wanted hers medium rare and they did it the wrong way round and when we 
tried to complain they didn’t like it” ii)… “when we got on to the M23 there was a lot of 
traffic there, I’m not sure what was causing the hold-up but yeah took a bit longer than 
expected to get there”.  and iii)… “I remember my en-suite the toilet wouldn’t flush properly, 
so we had to call maintenance for them to try to sort it out”.  
Common knowledge details refer to strongly invoked stereotypical knowledge about 
events. Three examples of common knowledge details are: i)… “we visited the haunted house 
and we went to London Eye” ii)… “we just went sightseeing to Bath Abbey and then just 
looked around there” and iii)… “yeah it was wonderful sightseeing. We went to the 
Colosseum”.  
Self-handicapping strategies refer to explicit or implicit justifications as to why 
someone is not able to provide information. Three examples of self-handicapping strategies 
are: i) “I’m not sure exactly what shops we went in because it was quite a while ago”, ii) 
“And then we just all sort of fell asleep in the car on the way back home” and iii) “We got 
there around the afternoon-ish and we looked around. And we went home after that because 
we were really tired because it’s quite tiring looking around and stuff”. (Examples 1 and 3 are 
explicit justifications and example 2 is an implicit justification.) 
 A second coder coded a random sample of 20 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability 
between the two coders, using the two-way random effects model measuring consistency, 
was high for complications (Average Measures, Intraclass correlation coefficient, ICC = .87) 
and for common knowledge details (Average Measures ICC = .87), and satisfactory for self-
handicapping strategies (Average Measures ICC = .65). Disagreements were resolved 
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between the two coders. All disagreements occurred because one coder missed a cue. To 
calculate the proportion of complications a total score was computed (number of 
complications + number of common knowledge details + number of self-handicapping 
strategies) and the number of complications was divided by this total score. Scores > .50 
indicate that the participants reported more complications than common knowledge details 
and self-handicapping strategies (when summed), whereas scores < .50 indicate that the 
participants reported more common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies 
(when summed) than complications. 
Results 
Motivation and preparation  
 Participants reported to have been motivated to perform well during the interview (M 
= 4.33, SD = .65), with no significant difference in motivation between truth tellers and liars, 
F(1, 51) = .08, p = .778, d = .08. Neither did significant differences emerge between truth 
tellers and liars in terms of preparation thoroughness, F(1, 51) = 2.71, p = .106, d = .46 and 
preparation time, F(1, 51) = 1.92, p = .172, d = .38.  
Hypothesis Testing 
 A 2 (Veracity) X 2 (Phase) MANOVA was conducted. Veracity was a between-
subjects factor and Phase a within-subjects factor. The five variables listed in Table 1 were 
the dependent variables.2 At a multivariate level the analysis revealed significant main effects 
for Veracity, F(5, 47) = 6.34, p < .001, partial eta2 = .40), and Phase, F(5, 47) = 11.62, p < 
.001, partial eta2 = .55. The Veracity x Phase interaction effect was also significant, F(5, 47) 
= 4.25, p =. 003, partial eta2 = .31.  
Table 1 about here 
The univariate Veracity main effects are presented in Table 1. Compared to liars, truth 
tellers reported significantly more complications and fewer self-handicapping strategies. 
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However, truth tellers and liars did not differ from each other in the total number of details or 
common knowledge details they reported. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported for the variables 
complications and self-handicapping strategies, but we failed to find evidence for a difference 
regarding the variables total details and common knowledge details. In addition, the 
proportion of complications was significantly higher for truth tellers than for liars, supporting 
Hypothesis 2.   
The univariate Phase main effects are also presented in Table 1. Participants reported 
more details and more complications in Phase 2 than in Phase 1. The proportion of 
complications was significantly higher in Phase 2 than in Phase 1. At a univariate level, 
significant Veracity x Phase interaction effects emerged for complications, F(1, 51) = 11.60, 
p = .001, partial eta2 = .45, common knowledge details, F(1, 51) = 5.75, p = .020, partial eta2 
= .10, and proportion of complications, F(1, 51) = 6.68, p = .013, partial eta2 = .12. The 
effects for total details, F(1, 51) = 1.87, p = .177, partial eta2 = .04 and self-handicapping 
strategies, F(1, 51) = 1.29, p = .262, partial eta2 = .03, were not significant.  
Table 2 about here 
Table 2 presents the results of simple effect analyses in which we compared the 
difference in detail between Phases 1 and 2 for truth tellers and liars separately. Despite the 
non-significant results for total details and self-handicapping strategies we also report the 
simple effect analyses for those two variables to obtain a complete picture.  
  Truth tellers reported more total details, more complications, and fewer common 
knowledge details in Phase 2 than in Phase 1. This supports Hypothesis 3.  Liars reported 
more details in Phase 2 than in Phase 1, whereas the other effects were not significant. This 
support Hypothesis 4 regarding total details but we failed to find evidence for a difference 
regarding common knowledge details. 
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 Table 2 also shows that truth tellers obtained a significantly higher proportion of 
complications score in Phase 2 than in Phase 1, whereas the proportion of complication score 
did not change for liars between Phases 1 and 2. This suggests that the proportion of 
complications score between truth tellers and liars was more pronounced in Phase 2 than in 
Phase 1, as predicted in Hypothesis 5. To statistically test Hypothesis 5, we first compared 
truth tellers’ and liars’ proportion of complications scores in Phase 1 as well as in Phase 2.  In 
Phase 1 the proportion of complications score for truth tellers (M = .57, SD = .40, 95% CI 
[.41,.73]) and liars (M = .48, SD = .39, 95% CI [.33,.64]) were similar to each other, F(1, 51) 
= 0.64, p = .427, d = .23 (-.31,.77). In contrast, in Phase 2 the proportion of complications 
score for truth tellers (M = .84, SD = .26, 95% CI [.72,.96]) was significantly higher than the 
proportion of complications score for liars (M = .51, SD = .36, 95% CI [.39,.64]), F(1, 51) = 
14.62, p < .001, d = 1.05 (.63,1.44). The effect size was also far more substantial in Phase 2 
than in Phase 1. Second, we compared truth tellers’ and liars’ proportion of complications 
scores in Phase 2 and included the Phase 1 complication score as a covariate. The covariate 
was significant, F(1, 50) = 22.47, p <.001, eta2 = .31. More importantly, the effect for Phase 2 
was still significant, F(1, 50) = 16.01, p <.001, eta2 = .24. These findings support Hypothesis 
5. We employed in Phase 2 the decision rule ‘Interviewees with a proportion of complication 
score > .50 are truth tellers, the others are liars’. This resulted in correct classifications of 20 
out of 27 truth tellers (74%) and 17 out of 26 liars (65%). By comparison, we compared truth 
tellers and liars in terms of reported total number of details in Phases 1 and 2. In neither 
phase a Veracity effect emerged: Phase 1, F(1, 51) = 0.50, p = .483, d = .19 (-.35,.73) and 
Phase 2, F(1, 51) = 1.90, p = .174, d = .38 (-.17,.92). In sum, the proportion of complications 
Veracity effect was significant in Phase 2, but not in Phase 1 and remained significant in 
Phase 2 even when we controlled for the proportion of complications score in Phase 1. The 
total number of details Veracity effect was not significant in Phases 1 or 2. This means that 
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proportion of complications was a more diagnostic cue to deceit than total number of details, 
at least in Phase 2.  
Discussion 
We found that the proportion of complications was a more diagnostic cue to deceit 
than total number of details, but only in Phase 2 of the interview, the post model statement 
recall phase. This finding emerged because truth tellers and liars responded differently to the 
model statement. Both truth tellers and liars added details to their stories and, as a result, total 
number of details did not differ between the two groups. However, the type of detail they 
added was different. Unlike liars, truth tellers added more complications to their stories and 
made their stories less scripted. 
 That a model statement makes the proportion of complications cue more diagnostic is 
a replication of Vrij et al. (2017b). In that experiment the model statement was a between-
subjects factor, in the current experiment we showed that the same effect occurs when a 
model statement is introduced as a within-subjects factor. This adds practical value to the 
finding because practitioners prefer within-subjects designs (Vrij, 2016). We introduced a 
model statement between Phases 1 and 2 because a model statement has shown to encourage 
interviewees to add details to their accounts. However, there is no theoretical reason why the 
present findings will only occur when a model statement is used. In theory, any intervention 
that encourages interviewees to say more should yield this effect. Several ways to encourage 
interviewees to say more have been examined to date, including the use of drawings 
(Mattison, Dando, & Ormerod, 2015; Vrij et al., 2017a), the introduction of a supportive 
second interviewer (Mann et al., 2013) and mimicking the nonverbal behaviour of the 
interviewee (Shaw et al., 2015).  
 Although we reasoned that examining complications, common knowledge details and 
self-handicapping strategies would be more effective for lie detection purposes than 
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examining total details, we did not expect that the variable total details could not discriminate 
truth tellers from liars at all. The absence of a Veracity effect regarding total details is 
unusual in deception research (Vrij, 2008). One obvious explanation for the absence of a 
Veracity effect is that our coding system was not sensitive enough to pick up differences in 
detail between truth tellers and liars. We think this is unlikely. We have used the same coding 
scheme in studies before and often found differences in detail between truth tellers and liars 
(Ewens et al., 2016; Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Hope, & Mann, 2017; Vrij et al., 2008).  
It is more likely that a combination of factors caused the absence of a Veracity effect 
for details. First, interviewees discussed an alleged trip. Of course, many liars have made 
trips in their lives before and probably could use those experiences to make up a detailed 
fabricated trip (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013). Second, liars were allowed to thoroughly 
prepare themselves for the interview which may have contributed to being able to provide 
detailed stories. Third, the interview protocol was very basic, as the interviewees were asked 
only one question.  Research has shown that more sophisticated theory-based interview 
protocols are typically required to obtain differences between truth teller and liars (Vrij, 
Blank, & Fisher, 2018; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, Leal, & Mann, 
2016). 
 An important point to consider is whether the proportion of complications will always 
be a more diagnostic cue to deceit than number of details or whether that depends on the 
scenario. This is an empirical question worth considering.  We do not rule out that it will be 
situation-related. For example, for proportions of complications to become effective, 
complications should occur and we think this unlikely to happen in very short encounters.  
 In this article, the within-subjects measure we used was a comparison between two 
phases of the interview. In real life practitioners often use a different within-subjects 
measure. Typically, prior to the interview, someone’s truthful responses during small-talk are 
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observed and these responses are then compared with responses during the actual interview. 
Different responses in both parts could then be indicative of deceit (Frank, Yarbrough, & 
Ekman, 2006; Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013). This type of baselining has been 
described as one of the most striking misuses of psychological research (Moston & 
Engelberg, 1993; Palena, Caso, Vrij, & Orthey, 2018). Fundamental differences exist 
between small-talk and the investigative part of the interview. For example, small-talk 
conversations are low-stakes situations where the interviewees’ responses are unlikely to 
have any negative consequences. In contrast, the investigative part of the interview is a high-
stakes situation that can have negative consequences for interviewees in case they will not be 
believed by the investigator. As a result, both guilty and innocent interviewees are likely to 
exhibit different behaviours during small talk compared with the actual interview (Hartwig & 
Bond, 2014), and this ‘apple–orange’ comparison will be prone to incorrect judgements 
(Moston & Engelberg, 1993). See Vrij (2016) for an overview of baselining.  
Applying verbal baselining in real life is challenging. Baselining methods would be 
most effective if truth tellers and liars display truly different response patterns, for example, if 
truth tellers always include more complications in their statements than common knowledge 
details and self-handicapping strategies combined and if liars always include more common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies combined in their statements than 
complications. In that case a clear cut-off score can be established, but this does not happen 
in real life. The current experiment showed that the decision rule ‘Interviewees with a 
proportion of complication score > .50 are truth tellers, the others are liars’ resulted in correct 
classifications of 74% of truth tellers and 65% of liars. Yet, the benefit of using within-
subject measures compared to between-subjects measures still exists. If just ‘amount of 
detail’ is considered, the problem arises that the amount of detail will not only be affected by 
veracity but also by individual differences in being eloquent (eloquent people may provide 
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more details) or preparedness (well prepared answers are likely to be longer than spontaneous 
answers). Those additional factors play a lesser role in within-subjects comparisons. That is, 
it is no longer relevant how detailed an answer is (which is largely influenced by being 
eloquent and prepared), but it becomes relevant how many complications, common 
knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies are included (more likely to be influenced 
by veracity).  
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Table 1.  
Total detail, complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies and proportion of complications as a function of Veracity 
or Phase.  
 Truth 
M (SD) 95% CI 
Lie 
M (SD) 95% CI 
F p Cohen’s d  
[95% CI] 
 
       
Number of details 137.44 (119.39) (101.03,173.86) 108.15 (57.47) (71.04,145.27) 1.28 . 263 0.31 (-.24,.85)  
Number of complications 8.41 (10.91) (5.22,11.59) 2.62 (3.85) (-0.63,5.86) 6.53 .014 0.70 (.14,1.25)  
Number of common knowledge 
details 
0.78 (1.31) (-0.29,1.84) 1.85 (3.70) (0.76,2.93) 2.00 .164 0.39 (.16,.93)  
Number of self-handicapping 
strategies 
.04 (0.19) (-0.16,0.24) 0.54 (0.76) (0.32,0.76) 11.01 .002 0.91 (.33,1.46)  
Proportion of complications 0.71 (0.28) (0.58,0.83) 0.50 (0.35) (0.39,0.64) 5.85 .019 0.62 (.06,1.16)  
 Phase 1 (initial recall) 
M (SD) 95% CI 
Phase 2 (post model statement recall) 
M (SD) 95% CI 
    
Number of details 47.28 (44.25) (34.94,59.74) 75.79 (55.03) (60.55,90.65) 41.79 < .001 0.57 (.17,.95)  
Number of complications 1.83 (3.74) (0.80,2.83) 3.74 (5.30) (2.34,5.05) 25.61 < .001 0.42 (.03,.72)  
Number of common knowledge 
details 
0.68 (1.25) (0.33,1.03) 0.63 (1.71) (0.17,1.09) 0.11 .739 0.03 (-.35,.41)  
Number of self-handicapping 
strategies 
0.15 (0.36) (0.06,0.25) 0.13 (0.34) (0.04,0.23) 0.16 .693 0.06 (-.48,.59)  
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Table 2.  
Total detail, complications, common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies and proportion of complications as a function of Veracity.  
Proportion of complications 0.53 (0.39) (0.43,0.65) 0.68 (0.35) (0.59,0.77) 10.71 .002 0.37 (.02,.75)  
       
       
 Phase 1 (initial recall) 
M (SD) 95% CI 
Phase 2 (post model statement recall) 
M (SD) 95% CI 
F p Cohen’s d  
[95% CI] 
 
       
Truth tellers       
Number of details 51.52 (58.70) (34.34,68.70) 85.93 (65.62) (64.85,107.01) 25.58 < .001 0.55 (.01,1.09)  
Number of complications 2.63 (4.88) (1.21,4.05) 5.78 (6.46) (3.88,7.68) 22.49 < .001 0.55 (.00,1.09)  
Number of common knowledge 
details 
0.59 (1.01) (0.11,1.08) 0.19 (0.48) (-0.46,0.83) 5.68 .025 0.51 (-.04,1.04)  
Number of self-handicapping 
strategies 
0.00 (0.00) (0.00,0.00) 0.04 (0.19) (-0.04,0.11) 1.00 .327 0.30 (.24,.83)  
Proportion of complications 0.57 (0.40) (0.41,0.73) 0.84 (0.26) (0.72,0.96) 13.52 .001 .80 (.23,1.34)  
Liars       
Number of details 42.88 (21.20) (25.38,60.39) 65.27 (39.93) (43.79,86.75) 16.58 < .001 0.70 (.13,1.25)  
Number of complications 1.00 (1.70) (-0.45,2.45) 1.62 (2.42) (-0.32,3.55) 3.84 .061 0.30 (.25,.84)  
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1 Note that many more types of detail than complications, common knowledge details and self-handicapping strategies exist, and that total details 
is not the equivalent of complications + common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies. See the Method section for more information.  
 
2 The correlation between number of complications and the proportion of complications score was r = .558, indicating that multicollinearity is 
not a concern. 
Number of common knowledge 
details 
0.77 (1.48) (0.27,1.27) 1.08 (2.33) (0.42,1.73) 1.56 .224 0.16 (-.39,0.70)  
Number of self-handicapping 
strategies 
0.31 (0.47) (0.12,0.50) 0.23 (0.43) (0.10,0.36) 0.65 .425 0.18 (-0.21,.56)  
Proportion of complications 0.48 (0.39) (0.33,0.64) 0.51 (0.36) (0.39,0.64) 0.33 .568 0.08 (.-.47,.62)  
